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professional achievement (for one's students and also
for oneself).
Like many others, I have also come to the conviction
that the struggle for human rights and social justice
cannot be isolated from concern for the welfare and the
rights of nonhuman animals, whose exploitation and
abuse have taken place on a scale that dwarfs that of
even the most oppressed human beings. As a result, of
course, a number of my friends in the medical school,
allies in other struggles, are now on the other side of
the fence. Even so, many thoughtful scientists have
serious reservations about the biotechnical revolution
and, not least among its marvels, the creation of
transgenic animals.
It is eminently understandable to view the
development of transgenic animals as an exciting area
of research, a new technology, promising new
biologically engineered solutions to many important
problems-among them, food and health.
But, like many other areas of modem scientific
research and development, the history of biotechnology
has also been marked by less altruistic promises: fame,
promotion, and, of course, financial reward for
individuals, as well as immense potential profits for the
institutions that employ them.
For some universities, grants from the National
Institutes of Health have become so important in the
budget that they have taken the place of the Department

It may seem strange that a professor of literature should
be addressing biologists on ethical issues related to
recombinant DNA. My literary interests and teaching,
however, have been concentrated for some years on
what Jean-Paul Sartre called litterature engagee, writing
that confronts political and social issues, that is
consciously in and of the world and involved in the
transformation of reality, rather tIlan standing outside it.
Together with other like-minded faculty, I also got
involved in political struggles at Stanford during the era
of university complicity in the conduct of the war in
Vietnam. 1hat was a time when many in the academic
world were moved to undertake an analysis of the
university's function in society, to criticize its
"corporatization," and to patticipate in adversatial action
against its administrative leadership on many fronts.
But the expression of ethical qualms about the
political impact of the university in the world ought
not to be limited to extra-curricular activity. Ethical
issues in academe are too often subordinated to skill
development and the transmission of ideas, with scant
attention paid to their moral implications. Teaching also
often tends toward the promotion of careerism and a
conception of success narrowly defined in tenns of
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of Defense funding that these institutions had come
to be heavily dependent on during the Vietnam war.
With the new sources of income provided by the
biotechnology revolution, in which the creation of
transgenic animals is now at the forefront, both
individuals and institutions have flung themselves into
a race for patents, with the prospect of wealth beyond
the dreams of avarice.
I shall not make the mad scientist or "Frankenstein"
argument, accusing biologists of seeking to play God
by tampering with the divine scheme of providence.
But there is a variant of that argument that more than
one scientist has invoked, quite independently of any
fundamentalist religious dogma: namely, the risk of
replacing the evolutionary process with a humanly
engineered universe of artificially created plants and
animals, including perhaps engineered human animals
as well. A colleague of mine at Stanford, biology
Professor Dow Woodward, for example, recently
invoked the risk of a "genetically engineered world
replacing the one produced by natural selection," going
on to say: "What is already on the drawing boards of a
few people shows an audacity roughly comparable to
that of last century's eugenicists." Others who have
issued comparable warnings include George Wald of
Harvard, Erwin Chargaff of Columbia and Robert
Sinsheimer of Cal. Tech. But important as prudence in
these matters might seem, it often runs afoul of very
powerful inducements to go full speed ahead and, as it
were, damn the torpedoes.
Among the moral issues that I believe biologists
might consider encouraging their students to reflect on
is, first and foremost. the pain suffered by the animals.
Many thoughtful ecologists who contemplate our
manipulation of animals of other species than our own
are troubled by a fear that the evolutionary process will
be affected or that Nature's rich array of species will be
impoverished. What is often forgotten, however, is that
for the individuals of a species, there can also be intense
pain and terror, not to speak of the almost inevitable
deprivation of life. One might call this an ontogenic
concern, as opposed to the predominantly phylogenic
concern of ecologists. These hurts and deprivations are
far from being negligible, as, for example, when medical
researchers take a blow torch to the body of a living
pig in order to study the pathology of bums or break
the back of a rat to learn how that affects the animal's
capacity for penile erection. In these, as in an almost
infinite number of other experiments-many of them
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useless by any reasonable standard-the researcher's
right to know, and possibly to profit from the knowledge
acquired, collides with the individual animal's right not
to be mistreated in this way.
Similarly, in the creation of transgenic animals, pain
is a factor that should not be left out of whatever
equations one constructs: pain for the fleshy pigs whose
skeleton is inadequate to bear added weight, for cows
whose distended udders scrape the ground and make it
difficult for them to walk. The only sensitive comment
on this that I have so far encountered in a scientific
journal was a letter from a Canadian veterinarian
published in Nature, I believe, in which he protested
the neglect of this consideration in the literature he had
read about transgenic animals. (He was referring
specifically to the physical discomfort implicit in the
introduction of genetic characteristics intO an organism
unprepared for them by its previous evolutionary
development)
Also among the innocent victims of this sort of
experimentation are the millions of transgenic mice who
are sacrificed (the word of choice among researchers),
in the ratio of thousands used to produce one mouse in
whom a gene is successfully implanted-that is in such
a way that the genetic characteristic actually expresses
itself in the animal.
It is well known that AIDS, in the form that afflicts
human beings, is a condition-"a syndrome"-that has
not naturally manifested itself in other species. Yet. a
medical technology that has refused to liberate itself
from the obsolete procedure of seeking cures for
human ailments and injuries by making healthy
nonhuman animals sick or injuring them is still engaged
in attempts to create artificially a transgenic animal that
will carry the virus, despite the misgivings of many
researchers who believe that clinical studies offer the
best hopes of success.
We have, I believe, a moral obligation to consider
what effect is produced on an animal-any sentient
creature--by introducing a genetic characteristic that
is not part of its own species history, a change imposed
invasively only to make use of the animal for some
purpose alien to its own being.
That purpose can, in fact, be very self-serving
(publication, prestige, profit). There was, for example,
not much interest in AIDS in the bio-medical industry
before the money started flowing. I know of at least
two of my colleagues at Stanford, who run what are
known in the medical school as "mouse factories," who
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expanded into the AIDS business with loud cries about
their service to humanity and have just started up their
own profit-making companies. We may justly question
the ethics of scientists who seek to enrich themselves
not only through the suffering of countless animal
victims, but also from research initially funded by grants
of the taxpayers' money.
We should also not forget that the bio-medical use
of animals has mushroomed into a multibillion-dollar
industry, including, amid the breeding for sale of many
species, a veritable explosion of marketable strains of
transgenic mice. The manufacture of food, cages,
stereotaxic devices and a multitude of high-priced
gadgets, is an immense business. For a glimpse at some
of its not always visible dimensions, study the trade
magazine Lab Animal. This week, Stanford's
Department of Comparative Medicine is hosting what
it calls a "rodent seminar," complete witll refreshments
(wine and cheese!), sponsored by the Charles River
Breeding Laboratories, the world's largest lab animal
factory--{)ne example among many of the ties between
today's universities and the corporate world. (See
Martin Kenney's book, Biotechnology: The UniversityIndustrial Complex, Yale Univ. Press, 1986, for a wealth
of documentation on this.)
I might here invoke two of those major moral
concepts that we presumably honor in our conduct
toward other human beings (although often more in the
breach than in the observance), but which we dismiss
out of hand when it comes to our treatment of nonhuman animals:

to an end, rather than as ends in themselves.
Kant's is doubtless the most familiar formulation
of the concept: "So act as to treat humanity,
whether in thine own person or in that of any
other, in every case as an end withal, never as
means only." On the threshold of the twenty-first
century, we ought to be morally advanced enough
not only to actualize at long last that precept for
human beings, but to consider its extension to
nonhuman animals.
Or are we to cling to our self-appointed role of
master species, as some of us refuse to relinquish the
myth that they are a master race or a master gender?
Are nonhuman animals so alien, so inferior to us, as
Jews and gypsies were to the Nazis and people of color
to white supremacists, that we are morally at liberty to
discard ethical principles when it comes to what we do
with and to them?
Certainly, in practice our species has proceeded
generally on that assumption, and has used nonhuman
animals as economic resources to exploit and as
products for consumption. To abandon these practices
and the attitudes that legitimize them will doubtless
represent a revolutionary ideological and behavioral
change for humankind. We might recall, however, that
it has been only recently in the history of our species
that the legitimacy of slavery can1e into serious question
(for example, the framers of the U.S. Constitution
resisted proposals to deal with the issue in that
document), as well as the use of women for breeding
children and for cheap labor. In fact, the treatment of
women as the property of their husbands and as amorally,
intellectually and physically inferior "subspecies"
continues unabated in many areas of the world.
In theory, too, we have still not liberated ourselves
(or our nonhuman animal victims) from the archaic idea
that even very bright men, like the great 17th-century
French philosopher and scientist Rene Descartes, clung
to, namely, that nonhuman animals are soulless
automatons, animated not by thought or feelings, but
by some sort of clockwork mechanism.
Today's scientists who try to still their conscience
as well as ours by denying animals of species other than
our own the capacity to think and have emotions and
feelings, including pleasure and pain, must confront the
contradiction between that anthropocentric fallacy and
the practice of exploiting animals because they are like
us and may even be related to us (assuming we don't

MIGHT DOES NOT MAKE RIGHT. There is no
question that we could not do what we do to
animals if they were not powerless to resist us.
What we do is "right" only for those who embrace
an ethical philosophy tllat legitimizes power.
THE END DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE MEANS
used to attain it. (See Simone de Beauvoir's Pour
une morale de I' ambig urte for a perceptive
analysis of this often grossly simplified issue.)
Assuming that the ends sought by the creation and
use of transgenic animals are desirable (an
assumption that deserves to be freshly questioned
in each instance), does this end justify the means?
How legitimate is it to "use" sentient creatures as
means to an end? Moral philosophers have long
argued against treating human beings as means
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wish totally to repudiate Darwin-who wrote,
incidentally, with great wannth of individual animals
for whom he had come to have real affection and a
strong feeling of kinship).
The engineering of transgenic animals inevitably
brings to mind all the disputes about eugenics, as applied
to the "improvement" of domesticated animals and
human beings~ notion that received much attention
in Hitler's Germany, but which had been conceived and
practiced earlier and is still with us.
There is, however, a substantial difference between
the relatively slow process of selective breeding (not
natural selection, but selective by human design) and
what has come to be called genetic engineering, even
though some of the scientists working in this field
minimize the distinction, obviously because they hope
that will make what they are doing seem less disturbing.
(A striking example is the 1987 statement on
"Introduction of Recombinant DNA-Engineered
Organisms into the Environment" issued by the National
Academy of Sciences.) It is true that both practices are
alike in that they thwart the slow natural evolutionary
process, but genetic engineering is far more radically
invasive of the organism and destructive of its integrity.
But just how sacred is the "natural" evolutionary
process? A group of scientists recently made modest
newspaper headlines by declaring that we have always
tampered with "nature" and that an absolute opposition
to any interference with a "natural" environment calls
into question practically all of human history. Their
gambit seems to me on the order of setting up a straw
man, the demolition of which proves very little. Of
course, we have always "tampered with nature"; only
the most benighted dogmatist would pretend otherwise.
But it is equally evident that we have not always done
so very wisely. Witness the massive deforestations
both past and present and today's truly criminal
destruction of the environment. The real question is:
how far do we go? Can we best deal with this problem
by concocting a rigid formula for setting bounds to
our interventions or should we be unrelentingly critical
and constantly reevaluating a situation that is not fixed
and permanent, but in perpetual flux? Above all, when
the interests-indeed, the very live8-{)f groups other
than the "tamperers" are involved, must there not be
ethically guided control?
To pursue this line rigorously means to question the
moral value, as well as the feasibility and utility, ofevery
invention or innovation that promises to alter the
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conditions of our existence and that of the other animals
with whom we share the earth. Moreover, the questions
and the decisions that follow them ought not to be left
to scientists. In a democratic society, we should all claim
the right to participate in decisions that affect all the
inhabitants of the planet.
The question is thus not whether we are to refrain
absolutely from transforming the world we live in.
Rather, we, as thinking beings whose consciousness (or
conscience) has come to require ethical decisions, must
assume responsibility for oversight and regulation of
the changes proposed by scientific activists.
This issue is related to what Jeremy Rifkin calls the
"desacralization" of nature. In an argument he
developed in his 1983 book AlgenYt Rifkin describes
the success of a mechanistic model of the universe,
laying particular stress on the triumph of the Darwinian
conception of evolution, which Rifkin sees as leading
to the present-day mechanistic ideology of the genetic
engineers-and, for that matter, of behaviorists like the
late B.E Skinner and the sociobiologists. For Rifkin,
desacralization "allows human beings to repudiate the
intimate relationship and likeness that exist between
ourselves and all other things that live."
Rifkin's analysis of the profanization of nature and
desacralization ofanimals is consonant with his critique
of the reductionist definition of life as a code to be
deciphered and of living entities as so many bundles of
information. To be sure, that has become an important
aspect of our contemporary conception of what a lifeform is, what with the development of both DNA
technology and computers, and also with what I might
call the desubjectijication of life in this century, in both
the capitalist and the socialist countries. It should also
be evident, however, that these perceptions amount to
only a small segment of our experience of the total
phenomenon of life.
What place does this reductionist vision offer to the
ethical considerations which are not part of the
genetically transmitted "code" of life, but which are
inseparable from the human race's history-not only
the history that others have made in the past, but the
history that we ourselves have the capacity to participate
in making and which, when all is said and done we
may well deem the most precious part of our identity?
There are other kinds of reductionism relatable to
that of the mechanistic biological engineer, among them
that view of economic and political behavior that
minimizes moral factors so as to enable those who
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control our society-like those who have come to
dominate some areas of scientific activity-to
subordinate ethical considerations to the quest for
power and wealth. In what is now being called
"corporate culture" (and, sad to say, university "culture"
too), this can mean that the material success of the
institution transcends the individuals who constitute it,
although the individual is presumed to find personal
fulfillment in helping the institution to realize its goals.
It is that kind of thinking that has facilitated the
corporatization of many of our universities-those (like
the University of California, for example) that we call
"public," as well as those that call themselves "private"
(like Stanford).
Our choice is, therefore, not simply between
secularism and retaining a belief in the "sacredness" of
life. Without having a set of beliefs consistent with those
of the established supernatural religions, without
divinizing "Mother Nature," one may still reject or at
least be skeptical of the impoverished mechanistic
reductionist conception of life that we associate with
both Descartes and Skinner.
Compare the present ideology of the scientific
establishment (as represented by some of its avatars,
like the American Medical Association, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, the
National Academy of Sciences and the great established
research universities), characterized by its reverence for
material achievement, with Albert Schweitzer's doctrine
of reverence for life, mindful that he, too, was a scientist,
a practicing physician, and not a comic-strip guru.
Which do we want to impart to our students?
Do we want students at our universities to be
coopted into a creed of greed, that subordinates humane
values to financial gain (a concept that also expresses
itself in oppressive labor policies and indifference to
political and social justice)? Do we want them to
internalize the values of academic administrators who
have supported the selling of the universities to
corporate interests and the racist apartheid regime in
South Africa with their investment policies and
continued war research and the production of nuclear
weapons as part of the university's mission?
Are these the attitudes, the goals, the values we
prize? Let us not be naive. Neither the universities'
institutional behavior nor their ideology is truly
impartial or neutral. Our science is not value-free, and
we should have the candor to recognize that. Our
science, like our other institutions, is oriented toward
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the maximization of profits and the minimization of
human values and ethical concerns. (Indeed, we have
seen something of a new discipline developing in some
faculties: the study of ethics as a branch of learning
dedicated to legitimizing in pseudo-ethical terms what
humane ethics condemns as monstrous and inhumane.)
What then is our bottom-line choice? I suggest
that it is, broadly speaking, between two ethics, two
courses of action:
A.The perpetuation of a mechanistic science
dedicated to the survival of a profit- and poweroriented society. We might also recognize that
the treatment of both human and nonhuman
animals as objects under our control and made
to serve our ends, instead of as conscious
subjects-what Rifkin calls desacralizationreflects an ethic of domination, in which control
of both animals and humans is associated with a
general domination of nature. At least since the
Renaissance, our civilization ("Western Civilization") has seen nature as our adversary, to be
fought, conquered, mastered, harnessed, "raped,"
and, of course, exploited for economic advantage-an aggressive, invasive, selfish and totally
anthropocentric and doubtless phallocenttic view
of the world.
B. The inculcation of an ethic of compassion and
empathetic understanding that respects the
subjective experience of other sentient beings,
both human and nonhuman, and an intellectual
attitude that questions authority, distances itself
from subservience to the corporate world and to
those who seek to corrupt our institutions of
higher learning by making them dependent on it
for trickle-down handouts.
Is what I have said tantamount to intransigent
opposition to any modification of the genetic structure
of animals? Not quite. I can conceive of legitimate
applications of genetic research, provided that they are
not exploitive of human or animal subjects (i.e.
acknowledging their subjectivity) or inconsistent with
their welfare. That would, I fear, rule out almost
everything presently going on in our laboratories,
because the welfare of the nonhuman animals
experimented on there is totally disregarded. Transgenic
animals are being created primarily to benefit corporate
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interests, researchers and the institutions they serve.
Most are condemned to death and even the survivors
are treated as objects without moral value.
One last word. If the subject is not to be exploited,
even benevolent action intended to promote its welfare
presents a moral issue. Can it be imposed without being
invasive? The "informed consent" that only recently
has been required for experimentation on human
subjects is obviously out of the question for nonhuman
animals. It is, therefore, imperative that their interests
be represented, however imperfectly, by human
advocates. I should like to believe that some of those
advocates who will lend their voice to speak on behalf
of the animals will be found among our students. Why
should they not include students of biology-the
science that studies and that should respect-if not
revere- life?
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